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South Sudan: (Dis)Agreements 
and Hope(Lessness)
1. Agreements Dishonoured
Since the outbreak of fighting in the Repub-
lic of South Sudan (RoSS) in December 2013, it 
appears there have been too many agreements, 
signed but dishonoured by the parties to the 
conflict led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit and 
former vice-president Riek Machar Teny. The re-
ality is different. There has been no peace deal 
between the two parties. 
So, what have these many agreements and 
headline ‘breakthroughs’ been about? They have 
been (a) an agreement to end hostilities and stop 
the killings, destruction and displacement of 
populations and (b) several intermediate steps 
(agreements) towards a peace deal and several 
re-commitments to the cessation of hostilities 
agreement, in the mediation process facilitated 
by the Inter-Governmental Authority on Devel-
opment (IGAD). 
The agreement on cessation of hostilities, 
signed on 23rd January 2014, included a deal on 
the status of key politicians under detention by 
the government at the time. That is not to say 
that the global public rage at the two leaders for 
their intransigence is unjustified. 
An estimated 50,000 - 100,000 people have died 
in this conflict and about 2 million people dis-
placed. Almost a quarter of the displaced have 
crossed borders into neighbouring countries of 
Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia while an 
estimated 100,000 people remain inside Unit-
ed Nations (UN) camps in the country. That’s to 
say nothing of the economic costs of the war for 
South Sudan, countries in the region and the in-
South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir, left, shakes hands with rebel leader and former vice president Riek Machar, 
right, as Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete, center, looks on after signing a framework agreement for further 
talks in Arusha, Tanzania.
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The refusal by the parties to honour the cessa-
tion of hostilities agreement is the biggest dis-
appointment and cause for anger. It may be un-
derstandable that negotiations towards a final 
settlement could take quite some time. But the 
continued deaths and deepening humanitarian 
crisis exerts a lot of pressure on the political di-
alogue process launched on 5th February 2014. 
IGAD has set up a mechanism for monitoring and 
verification of the implementation of the cessa-
tion of hostilities agreement. 
However, without strong and immediate punish-
ment for violations, the monitoring process on 
its own is inadequate for attaining a cessation of 
hostilities. To be sure, the incentives to silence 
the guns on either side are very low. From the 
beginning, both sides were into a fight and fairly 
confident that they would win it, on their own or 
with the military support of allies in the region. 
For IGAD, the limitations and challenges associ-
ated with a military intervention in South Sudan 
by the regional body or any other force, even in 
the short-term, are well appreciated. 
Understandably, IGAD has opted for a politi-
cal solution, fast!  Accordingly, when Kiir and 
Machar held their first face-to-face meeting 
in Addis Ababa on 9th May 2014, there was an 
agreement to be signed. The parties agreed to 
forming a Transitional Government of National 
Unity (TGoNU) and work towards a new constitu-
tion. They also recommitted themselves to the 
cessation of hostilities. The two sides had signed 
a recommitment on humanitarian matters and 
cessation of hostilities only four days before the 
leaders’ face-to-face meeting.
2. Transitional Government
In June 2014, the two leaders had another face-
to-face meeting in Addis Ababa and agreed 
that the successive phases of the peace process 
would entail a multi-stakeholder forum of polit-
ical groups (the three SPLMs - in government, in 
opposition and former detainees as well as other 
political parties) and other interested parties in 
the country, mainly civil society and religious or-
ganizations. From here, it got complicated. 
First, it took time for the two sides to agree on 
representation of the civil society organizations. 
But more importantly, the details of the transi-
tion arrangement have been hotly contested and 
remain the greatest threat to reaching a final 
settlement. The SPLM-IO argues that they took 
arms to fight for the re-structuring of the state 
in South Sudan to be more inclusive and equita-
ble. For them, the TGoNU is acceptable if it af-
fords them real opportunities to pursue change 
from within. 
That means sharing real power with Salva’s group 
and also retaining a fallback position in the secu-
rity arrangements that should allow for separate 
armies and a joint force, just like it happened in 
the comprehensive peace agreement between 
north and southern Sudan in 2005. As expected, 
Salva’s group would take none of these. For both 
sides, IGAD is rather forceful and impatient.
3. Sanctions and possible re-launch 
of peace process in Arusha
In Arusha, Tanzania, the two sides have signed 
two agreements under facilitation of Tanzania’s 
ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) and a rather 
obscure presence of South Africa’s African Na-
tional Congress (ANC). One of the Arusha deals 
was the framework towards addressing the “root 
causes” of the conflict, signed in October 2014 
South Sudan’s rebel leader Riek Machar (R) and South 
Sudan’s President Salva Kiir (L) exchange signed 
peace agreement documents in Addis Ababa
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and the other was the agreement for the re-uni-
fication of the SPLM signed on 21st January 2015. 
Ideally, the Arusha process should be compli-
mentary to the Addis process, and deals only with 
intra-SPLM conflict as a step towards agreement 
on the broader issues at the multi-stakehold-
er forum in Addis Ababa. So, when the parties 
signed another agreement soon after Arusha, 
in Addis Ababa on 1st February 2015, commit-
ting themselves to the signing of the final peace 
agreement by 5th March 2015 and the formation 
of the TGoNU by July 2015, there should be no 
confusion over the two processes. But that’s not 
the full truth. Thinking about the future, three 
things are important to keep in mind. 
First, for both the SPLM-IO and SPLM-IG, this 
is more about power for their respective groups 
than state reforms. Secondly, the three SPLMs 
are happy to remain in a peace process without 
the other stakeholders. 
Thirdly, even though IGAD can threaten sanc-
tions against the leaders to force a peace deal, 
those threats have to be weighed against the in-
terests of states and personalities within IGAD 
in South Sudan. As it is, the latest Addis agree-
ment leaves a lot of details of the TGoNU for fur-
ther negotiations. 
The powers of the (first) Vice-President (a posi-
tion Machar will most likely accept), proportion-
al share of ministries and the security arrange-
ments will be the most contested elements and 
potential deal breakers. 
IGAD may still force a deal, only if partner states 
make a stronger resolve at the expense of their 
own interests in South Sudan. Even then, there 
is no guarantee that a forced deal will hold for 
long. 
The parties may continue to seek solutions to 
the “root causes” of the conflict under the Aru-
sha process. There, the issues of transitional jus-
tice pushed to the periphery by IGAD may also be 
opened up. The peace process for South Sudan 
may, in the near future, not only relocate from 
Addis to Arusha, but also change mediation 
hands. After all, Burundi’s peace process also 
changed hands and venues. It happens.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn (C) signing the Cessation of Hostilities treaty over the war in 
South Sudan, alongside Salva Kiir (L), President of South Sudan, and Riek Machar (R), SPLM Opposition leader, 
in Addis Ababa.
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Can IGAD impose Sanctions? Policy Recomendations
ARRF has always supported targeted sanctions 
on individual leaders and their associates, espe-
cially freezing of assets and blockage of finan-
cial flows for these parties in IGAD regions. It will 
have a crippling effect on both sides. 
Unfortunately, IGAD member states are highly 
entangled in the South Sudan economy and they 
are unlikely to agree on sanctions and proceed to 
impose them.
Business and private investors from these coun-
tries will not allow their governments to impose 
any sanctions on South Sudan that may attract 
punitive retaliation on their investment in that 
country.
Yet sanctions and arms embargo by the UN and 
western countries may have an effect or make 
the warring parties ‘sit up’. 
However, once such sanctions are imposed, the 
peace negotiations will loose momentum and 
the UN as well as western countries may lose 
leverage in that process. 
Sanctions may be a way to let the world forget 
about South Sudan for a moment, but no solu-
tion to the crisis. 
They may have the effect of turning the situa-
tion into chaos and statelessness, redefining the 
problem differently from the current conflict as 
we know it.
1. Parties should honour the agreement for 
the cessation of hostilities) and stop kill-
ings, destruction of property and displace-
ment of populations. The IGAD monitor-
ing of implementation of the Cessation of 
Hostilities (CoH) agreement needs to inte-
grate the possibility of actions by member 
states against parties defying the CoH 
agreement. 
2. The parties should form the Transitional 
Government of National Unity (TGoNU) 
and work towards a new constitution 
within an agreeable time period, possibly 
a year. 
3. The Arusha framework addressing the 
“root causes” of the conflict, signed in 
October 2014 and the other agreement for 
the re-unification of the SPLM signed on 
21st January 2015 should be pursued as a 
long-term path to long-lasting peace, but 
not an initiative that may delay an imme-
diate settlement to current crisis. In that 
case, the agenda for the Arusha process 
should ‘spill-over’ from the Addis Ababa 
talks.  
4. Sanctions on individual leaders and their 
associates, especially freezing of assets, 
travel bans and blockage of financial flows 
for these parties in IGAD regions should be 
seriously considered by the international 
community
5. As much as possible, civil society rep-
resentation in the talks and post-agree-
ment activities needs to be maintained.
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